CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 447

I endorse the right of the General Assembly to approve or disapprove
any reorganization plan presented by the Governor, I am concerned
that the draft provision enables the Legislature to modify any proposal.

Legislative ability to modify reorganization plans obscures the clear
lines of executive responsibility. Moreover, the General Assembly may
be unaware of the effect of a modification on other executive func-
tions. Prohibitions of the power to modify does not deny the Legis-
lature the right to propose administrative reorganization or to reject
it. It simply prevents revisions which might create a structure deviating
in part or entirety from the administration's original objectives.

I fully accept and give credence to the form and philosophy of
Section 4. 20. If gubernatorial policies are to be implemented, it is
essential to assure the cooperation of all principal department heads
through direct and unlimited line responsibility.

The provisions of Section 4. 21 refer to the multi-headed adminis-
trative unit. A series of policy making Boards and Commissions have
evolved within the executive branch to direct principal departments.

I seriously question whether these multi-headed units are always
in the best interest of efficient administration, although I have found
incumbent Boards cooperative.

However, a functional flaw becomes particularly apparent when
the composition of a multi-headed unit is based upon staggered terms,
allowing a majority to remain in power well beyond the terms of
elected executive and legislative officials. This practice might en-
courage deliberate disregard of administrative controls and compro-
mise executive responsibility. Efficiency of a multi-headed unit is
also subject to serious scrutiny inasmuch as all policy determination
depends upon consensus and compromise. This, in some cases, could
lead to pet project log rolling among the Board members.

Article V generally sets forth measures to create a unified, indepen-
dent and professional judicial system. It is imperative that major
reforms occur within the Maryland judiciary, especially in courts of
original jurisdiction. Constitutional safeguards must be devised not
only to secure full and equal justice for all, but to guarantee that
judicial treatment be swift in time, professional in performance and
consistent in quality.

Under the leadership of Judge Emory Niles, a distinguished com-
mittee intensively studied and subsequently recommended major re-
forms for the Maryland judicial system. The Niles Plan, in essence,
is incorporated within the provisions of Article V.