CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 449

These cannot be amortized over a 15-year period without a dramatic
increase in the current tax burden. More importantly, because of the
beneficial life of these improvements, they probably should be liqui-
dated over a longer period.

Because of the complexity of this subject, I will later submit to
this Convention a separate memorandum specifying my views and
suggesting certain changes in the draft provisions.

Section 6. 05 is perhaps the most politically sensitive provision in
the entire draft Constitution. As an administrator who can proudly
point to significant accomplishments in increasing State financial aid
to all facets of public education, I am compelled to speak out forth-
rightly on this measure.

While I support the provisions of Section 6. 05 requiring the man-
datory inclusion of budgetary requests from the legislative and judicial
branches of State government, I contend that the executive and leg-
islative branches should have the authority to review and revise the
education budget. Education is a part of the executive responsibility
and while I do not deny its prominence in program priority, its bud-
getary provisions should not be excepted any more than those of the
departments responsible for securing our citizens' health and public
safety. The Governor and General Assembly, who in the -last analysis
are responsible for raising funds to support all State programs, and
who are held directly responsible by the electorate for any increase in
the tax burden, must be permitted the right to exercise discretionary
powers commensurate with this responsibility. There is no reason to
justify the obvious want of confidence in the executive and legislative
branches that this section implies.

The exception of budgetary control over education is inconsistent
with the constitutional concept requiring checks and balances to
exist among and not within any single branch of government. In fact,
this exception violates that constitutional principle in two of our
three branches.

Similar logic must be applied in your consideration of Section 6. 08.
If the provisions of Section 6. 05 require legislative and judicial
budgets to be transmitted as requested, it is my belief that the Gov-
ernor should have the right to exercise line item veto over these ap-
propriations as enacted by the General Assembly. Without this right
of executive review, the electorate is bereft of safeguards limiting
legislative expenses.