ways been am still decidedly opposed.
I will not stop to suggest all the objections
that might be urged against the expediency
of such a proceeding, or to show how unjust
would be the operation of such a tax, in im-
posing as it would upon the most populous
and prosperous portions of the State the
greater part of the valuations assessed to pay
for an institution in which they have not and
never had more than a comparatively trifling
I may say, consequential interest; but will
direct a few remarks to the very foundation
of this claim to State compensation.
Those who advocate it insist with great
confidence as sustaining their claims upon
that constitutional principle that the property
of the citizen should not be taken for public
uses, without a just compensation.
Were I to admit that slaves are property
within the true meaning of that word, it
would still be somewhat difficult to show how
the emancipation of such slaves is an appro-
priation of them to public use. But I go far-
ther, and hold that by no just construction of
that constitutional provision are negro slaves
property according to the universal accepta-
tion of that term. Property in its absolute
sense means, according lo the definition of the
best lexicographers, "that to which one has
an unrestricted right."
The property allowed to any one in African
slaves is not of that unrestricted character—
it exists only by the toleration of the com-
munity within which it is found. Take it
into a community which has not given its as-
sent to its existence, and property in it exists
no longer.
The ground of all the grief against eman-
cipation is, that it violates the private rights
of property of the slaveowner, and dedicates
it to public use, without compensation. The
constitutional right to bold slaves, or to re-
cognize property in man. is not derived from
the Constitution of the United States; nor is
slavery per se, as property in man, recognized
by that instrument. Slavery as property
owes its claim to State protection, to State
constitutional security, or protection, and the
restraints which State Constitutions impose
upon the Legislature concerning the relation
of master and slave. It is a well authenti-
cated historic fact, that the word slavery was
not introduced into the Constitution of the
United States, because it was, even at that
time offensive to the moral sense of the people;
and it—slavery—obtained only a negative
recognition in fact, or a qualified recognition
in the limitation imposed upon its character,
by the terms employed in its description.
"Fugitives from labor" is the description
persons, one who flees from labor which he
owes, from bodily service which is due to an-
other. In this modified form, and this only,
is it at all mentioned in the Constitution;
and if we seek to understand what it is, we
must go to the States in which it, exists, and |
there learn how it came to exist, and how it is
defined by State laws; the character of the
servitude; the extent of it, and the degree of
bondage which it imposes. '
I deny, therefore, that any aid can be
drawn from the Constitution of the United
States in support of the doctrine that it is
chattel property, upon the level of and of the
similitude with personal property generally.
On the contrary, I contend that from the
very term employed in its description, viz:
fugitive from. labor, it is necessarily implied
that it was very distinct in its nature from
ordinary chattel or personal property; and if
property at all, it is sui generis, different in
all essential elements from other property.
So far as its relation to the Federal laws is
concerned, it has been ever so treated; deair-
ing no further protection from them than the
exertion of the power of the Government to
give to State authority, under which it ex-
ists, its reclamation when beyond the State
jurisdiction. On the other hand, it ceases to
possess any attribute of property or to be
recognized as such beyond the limits of the
State where it exists, in any other sense than
the one already indicated, viz: that of recla-
mation.
It cannot be bought or sold; cannot be
retained outside of the State where it is al-
lowed, nor in anywise be dealt with or pro-
tected; but is, under the laws of other State?,
wholly ignored and repudiated as property.
It is not property, therefore, in the general ac-
ceptation of the term, and is only so in a
special and limited sense, and within a limited
sphere, to wit: in the State in which it exists.
If thrown back upon the State law or Consti-
tution for its vindication as property, it has
even then only a quasi or limited character
as property, for it is subject to provisions as a
person or persons, and is treated and consid-
ered in its relation to the body politic, in its
character as personal, entering into the basis
of population for representative purposes,
both in the State and Federal Government,
enjoying as persons, rights of protection to
life and health, and even absolute security
and defence against oppression and inhuman-
ity and fraud; for even in the matter of its
transfer and assignment, where it is limited
in its duration for a term of years, the State
law throws around it guards and securities,
by requiring both the vendor and vendee to
enter into written covenants, which, treated
in its personal character, provides for its vin-
dication as such against fraud
Is there, therefore, any analogy between a
cow ana a horse in which the owner enjoys
absolute property, and which property is in
its exclusive character the subject of legal re-
cognition, and man, a human being, which
the laws of every slave State deal with and
reward as a being entitled to protection in
person, as a person, and hold to accountability
by its penal and criminal jurisprudence? and |
