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THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: Not for an
elected attorney general. It would certainly
be a possible conflict for an appointed at-
torney general.
THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: Where lies the
difference?
DELEGATE MASON: Well, I think it
is quite obvious. If I appointed an attorney
general I certainly would have greater in-
fluence and control over his actions than
if he were elected by the people.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: Whether ap-
pointed or elected, as he attempts to advise
two opposing parties, is that not a conflict
of interest situation?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: Not necessarily;
as long as he gives them objective and im-
partial advice.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: And if that
objective and impartial advice is contra-
dictory, one to the other, is this not a con-
flict of interest situation?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: Well, at least
they will all be aware of what the im-
partial objective advice is and if necessary
then, the attorney general will, as he has
done in other cases, appoint outside coun-
sel to represent one of the other parties.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: And that would
be his only solution?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: I do not know if
that would be the only solution, but that
would be a solution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: But that ap-
pointed counsel is appointed by the attor-
ney general who has found himself in a
conflict of interest situation?
Is that correct?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: Well, I would not
agree that the attorney general has found
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himself in a conflict of interest position.
If it happens sometimes that he might
have conflicts within departments or per-
haps one would want an interpretation of
what the law should be the attorney gen-
eral would have outside counsel appointed
to bring the case to court so that they
could have a determination of just what
the particular law is. That has happened
quite frequently.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Byrnes.
DELEGATE BYRNES: I think you are
familiar, sir, with the very recent judg-
ment made in the attorney general's office
to take on appeal a very sensitive and crit-
ical issue involving the applicability of
certain tax laws of the country to state
employees, the question of interstate com-
merce, and essentially involving millions
and millions of state dollars.
The question I raise is similar to one
I asked with regard to the comptroller:
dividing the executive authority, who
would have the final say as to whether or
not that case would be appealed to the
Supreme Court?
Would it be the attorney general or
would it be the governor? I can see that in
this case they might both agree it should
go up, but who would have the final say
and who should have the final say?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: The attorney
general as chief legal officer for the State
has the final say and he should have the
final say. In the case to which you advert,
the attorney general had the agreement of
the governor that they should intercede in
this wage and labor case.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Byrnes.
DELEGATE BYRNES: Moving on, sir,
to another problem, in your amendment, if
I may address to that, which was dis-
tributed to us recently, you attempt to
freeze into the constitution what I think is
really an administrative decision, in that
the attorney general's office should handle
the appeals of criminal cases, or the ap-
peals of cases where the state has an in-
terest.
Why do you want that in the constitu-
tion, if I may ask?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: Well, I do not
want to say it has been in there for 103
years, that is why I want it, but if you
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