present ten-day limit is a critical need. I suggest that twenty days would be more practical. The Attorney General, I believe, would share my view since it often requires two weeks for his office to research and prepare opinions attesting to a measure's constitutionality.

The most vital sections of Article IV deal with the gubernatorial powers of appointment and reorganization. Here, executive authority can be most logically strengthened to achieve more responsive and more efficient administration.

Section 4.19 of the draft Constitution provides the governor with essential reorganization powers. Expanding and varying state problems virtually demand this authorization of executive initiative. While I endorse the right of the General Assembly to approve or disapprove any reorganization plan presented by the governor, I am concerned that the draft provision enables the Legislature to modify any proposal.

Legislative ability to modify reorganization plans obscures the clear lines of executive responsibility. Moreover, the General Assembly may be unaware of the effect of a modification on other executive functions. Prohibition of the power to modify does not deny the legislature the right to propose administrative reorganization or to reject it. It simply prevents revisions which might create a structure deviating in part or entirety from the administration's original objectives.

I fully accept and give credence to the form and philosophy of section 4.20. If gubernatorial policies are to be implemented, it is essential to assure the cooperation of all principal department heads through direct and unlimited line responsibility.

The provisions of section 4.21 refer to the multi-headed administrative unit. A series of policy-making boards and commissions has evolved within the executive branch to direct principal departments.

I seriously question whether these multi-headed units are always in the best interest of efficient administration, although I have found incumbent boards cooperative.

However, a functional flaw becomes particularly apparent when the composition of a multi-headed unit is based upon staggered terms, allowing a majority to remain in power well beyond the terms of elected executive and legislative officials. This practice might encourage deliberate disregard of administrative controls and compromise executive responsibility. Efficiency of a multi-headed unit is also subject to serious scrutiny inasmuch as all policy determination depends upon consensus and compromise. This, in some cases, could lead to pet project log-rolling among the board members.

Article V generally sets forth measures to create a unified, independent and professional judicial system. It is imperative that major reforms occur within the Maryland judiciary, especially in courts of original jurisdiction. Constitutional safeguards must be devised not only to secure full and equal justice for all, but to guarantee that judicial treatment be swift in time, professional in performance and consistent in quality.

Under the leadership of Judge Emory Niles, a distinguished committee intensively studied and subsequently recommended major reforms for the Maryland judicial system. The Niles Plan, in essence, is incorporated within the provisions of Article V.

While I have consistently endorsed the Niles Plan in principle, I believe certain practical impediments exist which will actually undermine its laudable purpose. I would particularly draw your attention to those sections dealing with the composition of judicial nominating commissions. Section 5.15 grants the Appellate Courts Nominating Commission composed of six lay persons and six lawyers, along with a judge, the sole power to designate the lawyers who may be appointed appellate judges. It becomes instantly apparent that one-half of the State's twenty-four subdivisions cannot possibly be represented on this Commission. If a member is chosen on the basis of appellate circuits there can only be one law and one lay member from each. This almost courts manipulation and could promote log-rolling.

We must ask ourselves honestly whether we have not simply exchanged masters rather than secured independence; whether we have truly removed the courts from politics or simply moved the politics from the General Assembly to the bar association; whether the judicial nominating system as proposed in the draft constitution does not militate against the appointment of the independent lawyer, the rural lawyer, the lawyer with a small, private practice.

I have great concern over the constitutional propriety of section 5.17, which grants the supreme court the right to decree what class among lawyers of the State will be eligible to serve and what class