THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 651

addition, was put together and given in the constitutional charac-
ter of a salary to the chancellor; similar to that described by the
act of 1792, to which this act, for greater certainty, was by its title
declared to be "a supplement"

In every instance, from the |£ear 1785 to the present time, where
it was the express intention of the legislature to give an additional
compensation to the chancellor, during their pleasure, it was given
to him as judge of the land office. And in all instances, where it
was intended to compensate him according to the terms of the
Declaration of Rights, the salary was given to him as chancellor.
This is manifest from all the acts, and the whole course of legisla-
tive proceedings from that time down to the 21st of February 1825.
For, it certainly could not have been the intention of the Assembly
of 1798 to loosen and set afloat the whole of the chancellor's
salary; to be paid or not according t the mere whim or caprice of
every succeeding body of legislators, in utter contempt of the con-
stitution; after the very solemn, and repeated declarations as to the
constitutional obligation the legislature was under to secure it to
him during the continuance of his commission, that had been so
carefully expressed and recorded.

But, it may be said, that if the act of 1798 is suffered to expire,
the act of 1792 will be virtually revived; and, from the nature of
the last mentioned act, it cannot be repealed; and, therefore, the
salary cannot be reduced below what the act of 1792 has given.
This position concedes the point, that the legislature is limited in
its control over a part of the amount of the salary. Now, if the
General Assembly had intended, by the act of 1798, to hold a dis-
cretionary power over the sum of three hundred and twenty-five
pounds, which is the difference between the salary given by the act
of 1792, and that given by the act of 1798, why was not the well
known and established precedent followed, of giving that additional
sum to the chancellor annually as judge of the land office 9 But the
manner, and the character in which the salary was given, have left
not the least doubt about the meaning of the General Assembly, in
passing the act of 1798. The act of 1797, ch. 71, having added
to the chancellor's salary, in a dubious form, by giving the addi-
tion to him " as chancellor and judge of the land office," it was not
perfectly certain, that the indicated character "as chancellor,"
would, when qualified by the expression, " and judge of the land
office" draw after it the constitutional security to the whole or only
to a part of this addition; and, therefore, to remove this doubt,