RINGGOLD'S CASE. 7
of the Court's opinion as to the nature and extent of the citizen's
right of appeal, I therefore deemed it proper to appoint a day for
hearing, so as to allow an interval within which the parties might
be permitted to take testimony in support of their allegations, and
so as to give time to look into the practice of the Court in relation
to appeals, for the purpose of having the subject carefully reviewed
and maturely considered.
It has always been regarded here, as well as in England, as a
constitutional right of every citizen to have his case reviewed, in
one form or other, by a court of error. (6) Under the Provincial
government, this right of the citizen to have a revision of a judg-
ment, in any civil case, affecting his interests, was extended, in
many instances, beyond the court of the last resort, in the Pro-
vince, to the king in council, (c) In reference to which extended
right of appeal, the Constitution of the Republic has emphatically
declared, "that there be a Court of Appeals, composed of persons
of integrity and sound judgment in the law, whose judgment
shall be final and conclusive in all cases."(d) So as thereby,
in the most distinct and positive terms, to exclude and prevent the
further prosecution of appellate proceedings, in any case, from that
ultimate tribunal of the Republic, as had been before allowed under
the government of the Province.(e)
This right of appeal seems to have been conceded to the citizen
by the common law, in all civil cases, without check, or control of
any kind whatever, (f) A writ of error was granted, on demand,
as a matter of right ;(g) and, if the appellant was at all appre-
hensive, that proceedings, in execution of the judgment which had
been so taken up by the writ of error, would not be stayed, he
might, as of course, sue out a writ of supersedeas for the purpose
of having all such proceedings suspended until a decision was had
upon the writ of error.(h) The form of the writ of supersedeas,
which followed, as the adjunct and auxiliary of the writ of error,
was thus, "that if the judgment be not executed before the super-
sedeas, the Sheriff is to stay from executing any process of execution
until the writ of error is determined."(i) Hence it was, and not
from the quaint notion, that an execution being an Intire thing
which, when once begun, must be completed, that, if the fieri
(I) Christie v. Richardson, 3 T. R. 78.—(c) 1773, eh. 7, s. 5.—(d) Const, art. 56.
(e) Hammond v. Ridgely, 5 H. & J. 268.—(f) Tidd, Pra. 1074.—(g) D. Regina v, Paty,
2 Salk. 504.—(h) vide Supersedas.-(i) Meriton v. Stevens, Willis, 981.
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