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674 THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE
and that the partnership, so formed was, by the express stipulation
of that deed, to continue for the term of ten years; which term,
therefore, did not expire until the 25th of September, 1823, after
the 5th of April, 1819, the day on which those who constituted
the association of Richard Caton^ John Gibson and others, were
regularly organized as a body politic, by the name of The Cape
Sable Company', under their act of incorporation, (x)
It is true in general, that where a partnership is formed for a de-
finite period of time, it can only be, dissolved by the consent of
the parties, or by the effluxion of the specified period of time, (y)
But, if one of the contracting parties refuses to continue the part-
nership, or does an act which renders its further continuance im-
practicable, it must be then terminated; and the only remedy of
him who wished its continuance, is upon the contract for a compen-
sation in damages for the injury he has thereby sustained, (z) A
partnership for a definite period may be determined before the spe-
cified time has elapsed, either by the act of God, as by the death
or the habitual mental insanity of one of the partners; or of the
government, as by a declaration of war between the countries of
the parties; (o) or it may be terminated by the misfortune, or by
the illegal or fraudulent conduct of a partner, as by his insolvency
or bankruptcy. The partnership is held to be thus absolutely ter-
minated; because, it is deemed unjust, that the surviving or sol-
vent partner should have a stranger intruded upon him in place of
Mm in whom he had confided, and with whom he had, therefore,
associated himself; and also, because it would be in a great degree
or altogether impracticable to continue the partnership after such
an event, upon the terms on which it was originally formed, (b)
Here the association, constituted of Richard Caton, John Gibson
and others, have virtually refused to continue the partnership they
had formed with Lechleitner and Troost any longer, by transferring
all their estate to a newly erected body called The Cape Sable
Company; and by taking upon themselves the capacities of that
body politic they have virtually and effectually cast off all connexion
with their former partners Lechleitner and Troost. (e) By an ex-
press provision of the act of incorporation, by which they have
(x) 1818, ch. 195. —(y) Collyer Part 57, —(z) Skinner v. Dayton, 19 John. 538 —
(a) Griswold v. Waddington, 15 John. 57. —(b) Collyer Part. 58; Marquand v.
The New York Manufacturing Company, 17 John. 525. —(c) Bethel Church v
Donnom, 1 Desau, 154,
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