

Under the acts of 1776, ch. 14, and 1715, ch. 47, the enrollment of deeds is a substitute for, and equivalent to, the act of livery. *Rogers v. Sisters of Charity*, 97 Md. 553; *Riley v. Carter*, 76 Md. 596; *Handy v. McKim*, 64 Md. 569; *Evaus v. Horan*, 52 Md. 611; *Key v. Davis*, 1 Md. 39; *Mathews v. Ward*, 10 G. & J. 448; *Smith v. Steele*, 3 H. & McH. 104.

As to proof of whether or not a deed was indented, see *Gittings v. Hall*, 1 H. & J. 14.

1904, art. 21, sec. 24. 1888, art. 21, sec. 24. 1860, art. 24, sec. 24. 1782, ch. 23.

24. Any person seized of an estate tail, in possession, reversion or remainder, in any lands, tenements or hereditaments may grant, sell and convey the same in the same manner and by the same form of conveyance as if he were seized of an estate in fee simple; and such conveyance shall be good and available, to all intents and purposes, against all persons whom the grantor might debar by any mode of common recovery, or by any ways or means whatsoever.

Under this section, an estate in fee tail amounts to a fee simple. *Tongue v. Nutwell*, 13 Md. 424. And see *Thomas v. Higgins*, 47 Md. 452; *Estep v. Mackey*, 52 Md. 599; *Benson v. Linthicum*, 75 Md. 144.

Where there is a judgment against a tenant in tail who subsequently sells the property and thus enlarges the estate under this section, the fee simple estate is not liable to be sold for the payment of the judgment. The words "debar by any mode of common recovery," construed. *Maslin v. Thomas*, 8 Gill, 18. See also, *Coombs v. Jordan*, 3 Bl. 299.

Under this section, a tenant in tail may defeat the estate altogether or convey only a qualified estate. Effect of an absolute and also of a qualified conveyance. Under this section, an estate tail cannot be devised. *Laidler v. Young*, 2 H. & J. 71. And see *Paca v. Forwood*, 2 H. & McH. 176.

The claim of a tenant in tail, held to be barred by limitations and adverse possession. *Wickes v. Wickes*, 98 Md. 318.

An estate tail special, held subject to be docketed under this section. *Pennington v. Pennington*, 70 Md. 436. And see *Brogden v. Walker*, 2 H. & J. 285; *Todd v. Pratt*, 1 H. & J. 465; *Ridgely v. M'Laughlin*, 3 H. & McH. 220.

By this section, the ancient mode of docking estates tail by common recovery is abolished. *Newton v. Griffith*, 1 H. & G. 128; *Maslin v. Thomas*, 8 Gill, 18.

Purpose and construction of this section. *Key v. Davis*, 1 Md. 41.

This section held to bar the reversiory interest of the proprietary. *Howard v. Moale*, 2 H. & J. 261.

For cases involving the act of descents (1786, ch. 45), as applicable to estates in tail, see *Posey v. Budd*, 21 Md. 477; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 H. & J. 314. See also, article 46, section 1.

For cases involving estates in tail, see *Partridge v. Dorsey*, 3 H. & J. 302; *Carroll v. Maydwell*, 3 H. & J. 292; *Jones v. Jones*, 2 H. & J. 281; *Hopkins v. Threlkeld*, 3 H. & McH. 443; *Calvert v. Eden*, 2 H. & McH. 279.

This section referred to in construing a will. *Chelton v. Henderson*, 9 Gill, 438.

Ibid. sec. 25. 1888, art. 21, sec. 25. 1860, art. 24, sec. 25.
1856, ch. 154, sec. 21.

25. Every power of attorney authorizing an agent or attorney to sell and convey any real estate shall be attested and acknowledged in the same manner as a deed, and recorded with the deed executed in pursuance of such power of attorney; but a corporation shall have power to appoint an attorney for the same purpose by its corporate seal.

Where the power of attorney is recorded prior to the recording of the deed, this section is complied with. *Rosenthal v. Ruffin*, 60 Md. 326.