[Art. 3] LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 79

Where the construction of a street railway is duly authorized and there is no in-
vasion of or physical interference with, the property of an abutting owner, there is
no taking of such property within the meaning of this section. Cases reviewed. An
injury to, and a taking of property, are distinct things. This section does not apply
where land is not actually taken, but only indirectly or consequentially injured.
Poole v. Falls Road Ry. Co., 88 Md. 536. And see Garrett v. Lake Roland Ry. Co.,
79 Md. 279; O'Brien v. Baltimore Belt R. R. Co., 74 Md. 370.

Distinction between property merely injured and property actually taken. Munici-
pal corporations changing the grade, etc., of the streets under legislative authority,
are not responsible for consequential damages if they exercise reasonable care in the
performance of the work. Cumberland v. Wilison, 50 Md. 138; Baltimore v. Dobler,
140 Md. 641 (reviewing and distinguishing prior cases).

Where a plaintiff's access to her property has been practically destroyed by a city
in grading streets, her property is "taken" and she is entitled to compensation under
this section. Prayers. Sanderson v. Balto. City, 135 Md. 522.

Where property does not abut on the portion of a street which is closed, and ingress
and egress to and from the property has not been affected, but the direct approach
to it by way of the closed street is cut off, a more circuitous route being required,
an appeal from the refusal of the commissioners for opening streets to allow damages,
is properly dismissed; the property is not "taken" in the constitutional sense, and the
owner CIA not entitled to damages. Cases reviewed. German Lutheran Church v. Balti-
more, 123 Md. 145.

If property is not "taken, " but mere inconvenience of access or diminution of light
and air is caused, this section is not violated, and equity will not interfere; recovery
at law. Cases reviewed and distinguished. Baltimore v. Bregenzer, 125 Md. 82; Taylor
v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 142.

For a railroad to allow steam or hot water from its round-house to flow over adjoin-
ing land so as to make a deep ditch or ravine, and by undermining the soil wash away
a bridge, is a "taking" of property within the meaning of this section; hence, relief
may be granted in equity. When the plaintiff will be limited to damages at law. Cases
reviewed. N. C. Ry. Co. v. Oldenburg, 122 Md. 248.

The discharge of sewage from a disposal plant near plaintiff's property so as to
cause odors thereon and thus depreciate its value, held not to be a "taking" within
the meaning of this section; recovery of damages at law. Cases reviewed. Taylor v.
Baltimore, 130 Md. 137.

Consequential damages resulting to land from mere change of grade, without physical
injury to property itself, is not taking of property and abutting landowner has no
right of action if work is lawfully authorized and skillfully done. Smith v. B. & O. R. R.
Co., 168 Md. 93.

Property rights. Additional servitude.

Telegraph or telephone companies in constructing lines over private property are
subject to this section; every additional burden cast upon land outside the purpose
and scope of an original easement, gives the owner a new claim for compensation.
Sufficient allegations justify an injunction. Meaning of the term "public use. " If
secs. 294 to 298 of art. 23 of the An. Code contain provisions authorizing the con-
struction of telegraph lines on property before paying compensation therefor, the
owners being left to seek damages at law, such provisions are in conflict with this
section. American Telegraph Co. v. Pearce, 71 Md. 539.

Planting telephone poles upon the right of way acquired by a railroad company, when
the telephones are used for purposes other than the operation of the road, imposes an
additional servitude upon the soil which requires the payment of compensation under
this section. C. & P. Telephone Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 47.

The crossing of a railroad by another road subsequently chartered and the use of
the former's tracks for the distance of five miles, could only be lawfully effected, against
its assent, by an exercise by the legislature of eminent domain, subject to this section.
In exercising the right of eminent domain, the legislature cannot in the law fix the
compensation to be paid as that must be passed on by a jury under this section.
Pa. R. R. Co. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 60 Md. 269.

The right to use one's lot for pasturing cows in a reasonable way, although a stream
of water which flows through said property may be polluted, is a right of property,
and a corporation doing business lower down the stream may only acquire the adja-
cent owner's water right by making due compensation under this section. Helfrich v.
Catonsville Water Co., 74 Md. 277.

Distinct interests in property.

Where nearly three-fourths of a lot subject to one ground-rent is condemned, is
private property which cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, etc.;
this is true although the remainder of the lot is sufficient to secure the ground-rent.
As a general rule, the sum of the values of distinct interests in a piece of property
must be the full value of the property taken. How the reversioner should be com-
pensated where a substantial portion of the lot out of which the ground-rent is payable
is condemned. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 628. And see Hagerstown v. Groh,
101 Md. 563; Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 321.