

ing within space set aside exclusively for parking purposes, in congested sections, and this provision shall not be deemed as repealed by any Act hereafter passed unless this provision is expressly referred to and repealed in terms, or some other clear evidence given of an intent on the part of the General Assembly to change the policy of the State herein declared; and provided further that nothing contained in this section shall be taken to apply to any subsequent or contemporaneous Act of the General Assembly of Maryland itself altering the charges to be made for the registration or operation of motor vehicles engaged in the business of common carriers, or placing such a special class for regulation in other respects.

No city, county or other municipal sub-division of the State shall have the right to make or enforce any local ordinance or regulation, under the guise of a traffic regulation, to compel the sounding of bells, horns or other signalling devices.

Nothing in the sub-title shall be taken in any way to add or to detract from the right of any person injured in his person or property by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle to sue and recover damages as in the case of the negligent use or operation of other vehicles, and the violation of any provision of this sub-title shall not be taken to give any right of action to any individual who would not be entitled to the same in the absence of such provision.

This section referred to in holding invalid an ordinance of Havre de Grace prohibiting non-residents of that city from operating automobiles for hire; unreasonable discrimination. *Havre de Grace v. Johnson*, 143 Md. 605.

There is nothing in statute laws of Maryland relative to motor vehicles inconsistent with the well settled principle of common law, that a master is not liable for the unauthorized acts of his servant not committed within the scope of his employ. *Symington v. Sipes*, 121 Md. 319.

Acts of 1916, ch. 687 and ch. 610, compared and contrasted; the latter applies to motor vehicles used as common carriers, including a jitney, although its route may vary from time to time. Indictment upheld. Class "F" of sec. 157 has no application to a jitney. The fact that ch. 610 applies to jitneys does not make it applicable to taxicabs. Power reposed in public service commission under ch. 610. *Smith v. State*, 130 Md. 484. And see *Goldsworthy v. Public Service Commission*, 141 Md. 682.

The term "common carrier" includes motor vehicle transportation companies—art. 23, sec. 345.

See notes to secs. 162 and 187.

*Re. lien for storage, repair and accessories of motor vehicles*, see art. 63, sec. 41, *et seq.*

*Re. lights on vehicles at rest on public highways*, see art. 27, sec. 627. As to theft of automobiles, see art. 27, secs. 396 and 397.

See secs. 293 and 311, *et seq.*

This section cited in holding invalid portion of ordinance of Baltimore City giving right of way to vehicles of physicians, without providing means of identifying such vehicles. *Kidd v. Chissell*, 146 Md. 172.

As to fraud—motor vehicles, see art. 27, sec. 216.

As to fraud—motor fuels, see art. 27, sec. 279, *et seq.*

Cited but not construed in *Greer Transportation Co. v. Knight*, 157 Md. 537.

1927, ch. 520, sec. 171A. 1929, ch. 319, sec. 171A.

**146.** Except to the extent that they may be specifically authorized by other provisions of this sub-title, no city, county or other political subdivision of this State shall have the right to make or enforce any ordinance or regulation upon any subject for which provision is made in this sub-title. The provisions of this sub-title (except as herein otherwise specifically provided), are intended to be exclusive of all local and municipal legislation or regulations, upon the various subjects with which this sub-title purports to deal, and all public local laws, ordinances and regulations, inconsistent or identical therewith, or similar or equivalent thereto, are hereby repealed; and the charters of all municipal corporations of this State are