you admit my Distinction, but then you urge it will not serve my Purpose, because (you say) Altho' in the Enacting a Law in the first Instance, it must necessarily be supposed, from the not giving it a Limitation, to be the Intention of the Legislature that it should be perpetual, unless it be in it's own nature made but for a temporary Purpose, yet you apprehend there is no room for the like supposition in the present Dispute. And you say further, That "if there be no necessity to suppose it the Intention of the Legislature, that the Law of 1715 should, by that of 1722, be made perpetual, this Case is then clearly without Distinction." I cannot comprehend why the same Reason will not hold in a reviving Law without Limitation, which you admit to be in a Law in the first Instance; but I cannot help expressing my Surprize at such palpable misconceptions as you have entertained concerning the Continuance of Laws; for your Reasoning tends to prove, that a Law once made must cease, unless some Intention of the Legislature can be proved that it should continue: This Proposition, however harsh and even absurd in Terms, it must now appear, yet is really the scope of your whole Argument, whereas, had you thought fit to have considered, that when a Law is once made, or has an Operation or Force, either in the first Instance, or by Revival, it must necessarily always continue in force, unless the Cause, nature, or some express Limitation in the Law, determine it; you would have saved me and your selves much Trouble and Time on this Subject. A Command or Law, in the nature of the Thing, once in force, tho' but for a moment, must necessarily always continue, unless determined by some of the aforegoing Circumstances; for there is no necessity to shew any Intention to continue it, but to determine it; and if you should deny this plain Proposition, I will not pretend further to convince you. This being so, my Distinction is applicable to the Law of 1715, which was put in force without any Limitation of Time, by the express words of the reviving Law of 1722, and now continues, since there is no Circumstance in the nature of the Thing commanded, or Occasion of making it, to determine it. You have started another notion yet more extraordinary, viz. That the Clause of Limitation in the Law of 1715 was revived by the Law of 1722: was such an Assertion ever thought of by any Lawyer, or even other Person whatsoever as, that when a Law is revived, the very continuing Clause is revived? What Jargon and Clashing must arise in the Exposition of the Continuance of Laws, by such Doctrine? The Law of 1715 is, by the continuing Clause in the Law itself, to be in force for three years, and to the End of the next Session; which must mean three years from that Session in 1715, or nothing: The Law in 1719 revived that Law for three years &ª which must be from 1719, and the Law in 1722 continued that Law without any Limitation. But if the Law of 1719 and 1722 revived the continued Clause of 1715 with the other Parts of the

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