

eignty, for certain purposes, and not so for others.

"The Constitution of the United States being established by competent authority, by that of the people of the several States, who were the parties to it, it remains only to inquire what the Constitution is, and here it speaks for itself. It organizes a government into the usual legislative, executive and judicial departments; invests it with specified powers, leaving others to the parties to the Constitution; it makes the government operate directly upon the people; places at its command the needful physical means of executing its powers; and finally proclaims its supremacy, and that of the laws made in pursuance of it, over the Constitution and laws of the States; the powers of the government being exercised as in other elective and responsible governments, under the control of its constituents, the people and Legislatures of the States, and subject to the revolutionary rights of the people, in extreme cases.

"Such is the Constitution of the United States *de jure* and *de facto*; and the name, whatever it be, that may be given to it, can make it nothing more nor less than what it actually is."

The *resolutions* of 1798 have been cited here to sustain the States' rights doctrine. They were appealed to by the gentleman from Prince George's (Mr. Belt,) and the gentleman from Somerset (Mr. Jones,) who said that the States had prospered under the effect of those resolutions, as managed and controlled by the democratic party, and had attained such prosperity as they had never known before. I deny that the resolutions of 1798, the Kentucky and the Virginia resolutions, sustain any such doctrine. What are those resolutions? They were enacted in order to counteract what was called the alien and sedition law of that time. They were framed by Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson, passed by Kentucky and Virginia, and were sent to the other States, but not a single other State adopted them. General Washington said it was done with a political view, and it had its effect in the election of Jefferson as President, and the appointment of Madison as Secretary of State. Leaving that out of view, I have merely to say that they do not sustain these doctrines, and Mr. Madison, one of their authors, said they did not. In the letter which I have just read, he utterly denies that doctrine; and to say that the resolutions contain it would have made him inconsistent with himself.

In reply to the doctrine of coercion I have only to say that Jefferson held that the doctrine of coercion was even contained in the articles of confederation. Washington, in his Farewell Address, said it was for the purpose of a consolidated government that the Constitution was formed.

What is the absurdity into which we are led by this doctrine as proclaimed and announced by Buchanan, that a State has no right to secede, and that the government has no power of coercion? Suppose in 1793, when the whiskey insurrection broke out in Pennsylvania, when General Washington, with 15,000 men, marched to quell it, the State of Pennsylvania had said by its Legislature, that the law was unconstitutional, and that it should not be enforced. What would have been the result? Would General Washington have been required to return home with these 15,000 men? The proposition is absurd upon its very face.

Suppose that when Millard Fillmore was President of the United States, and attempted to execute the fugitive slave law in the streets of Boston, it had been said then, you cannot coerce a State; and suppose the Legislature of Massachusetts had said, you shall not enforce the fugitive slave law here. Would these gentlemen then have said there was no right to coerce a State? I imagine not, because the negro was in question then.

Take another instance. When John Brown with half a dozen deluded followers, some time ago, invaded Virginia, suppose that the State of Pennsylvania or any other State had by its enactments, said that the General Government had no right to restrain John Brown, or protect the citizens of Virginia? But I think gentlemen did not then agree to the doctrine that the United States Government had no right to coerce. The coercion was then to operate upon the other side.

In conclusion, these gentlemen want peace. They did not want peace when South Carolina, with ten thousand men and with batteries planted all around, fired upon a few starved men in Fort Sumter, whom the Government had not even attempted to reinforce, but simply to feed. When they tore down the old flag and trampled it under their feet, and said that the rebel flag should wave over Faneuil Hall, and that they would dictate terms of peace in the city of Washington, they did not want peace then. But they want peace now. Why? Because the General Government have shown their teeth; because they have demonstrated that there is power and a determination upon the part of the people to execute the laws. Now they want peace, and deprecate bloodshed. Sir, I want no peace with Fort Pillow murderers, or renegades of the same scenes at Newbern. I want no peace with men who will destroy and torture our prisoners in the way they have done, until they will lay down their arms and submit to the authority of the Government, and acknowledge and yield to the civilization of the age.

I have already trespassed upon my time, and I will not occupy the attention of the Convention longer, except to say here and now, that novelty though it may be, I am