CUNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.—1 BLAND. 307

called for five hundred acres "adjoining the west line of Gore,"
it was held, that the description "was sufficient to * bind
the vacancy to a certain extent; " but it is not said how far. 329
Portland v. Smith, MS. 19th April, 1815.

adjoining to the following tracts of land, or some of them, viz. Nicholas
and John, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th. 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th discoveries, &c. Several cer-
tificates, including those now in dispute, were returned in May, 1776; and
patents thereon not having been issued, the present caveats were entered in
September, 1807.

One of the objections stated by the caveator is. that patents were not
taken out within two years, according to the 11th section of the orders and
instructions in 1733. The Chancellor is not satisfied of the validity of this
objection; nor is he informed of any case in which it has prevailed. There
is apparently still less force in the objection arising from the situation of the
chain-carrier, as proved by the deposition of Samuel Hawkins, and also in
the trifling errors in the phraseology of the warrant, which were mentioned
in the argument. It would seem, therefore, that the point most relied on
by the caveator, is the want of precision in the location, or as he expressed
it, the location being too broad.

It is certainly the interest of every person who takes out a special war-
rant, to describe or locate the land as clearly and precisely as he can. in
order to bind and secure it from the operation of other warrants; but there
is no set form, or expression required in order to comply with the general
rule, which (as laid down by the late Chancellor in 1793,} was, that the de-
scription of the warrant should suit none but the land contended for. and
that it should be so full and certain as plainly to point out the intention.
There is, however, some reason to doubt whether the rule was not less strict
before the Revolution, for it appears that the special warrants in the years
1773 and 1774, seldom went further than to state the vacancy to be adjoining
to some particular tract or tracts, either naming them or the persons in pos-
session of them.

In the case of Pumphrey v. Wallace, the reasons for allowing the caveat of
the latter are not expressed, and can only be inferred from what appears on
the papers; because it would be totally improper to take the opinion of C.
Wallace, as expressed in his deposition, or that of any other person, as evi-
dence of such reasons. Pumphrey's warrant was dated the 28th of Decem-
ber, 1792, and executed on the 6th of February. 1793. But Wallace had
taken out a warrant of resurvey on the 18th of January, 1793; so that the
question must have been how far the location made in Pumphrey's warrant
was binding, so as to prevent the operation of the "warrant of Wallace,
which bound all the contiguous vacancy, supposing it not previously se-
cured. The vacancy in dispute consisted of cultivated land, as appears by
the receipt of the treasurer for improvements; and it may be inferred, that
the caveat was ruled good on the ground of the location in Pumphrey's
warrant being vague and indefinite, as was decided in the case of Beatty v.
Orendorf, in 1793, (Land Ho. Ass. 400,) in which the vacancy was also culti-
vated land, and the claim of Orendorf on a warrant of resurvey.

It is not, however, necessary in the present cases, to determine whether
the location or description in the warrant, was sufficient to bind or secure
the vacancy aimed at, or to say what would be the result of the facts estab-
lished by the depositions and the surveys returned, because the several par-
cels of land returned in Goodwin's certificates do not appear to have been
cultivated, or to have had improvements thereon; and therefore must be