THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 595
THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.
The circumstances and causes which led to the adoption of the thirtieth article of the
Declaration of Rights relative to judicial independency. The manner in which
the several provisions of that article were introduced and established.
A salary once given to, or which has become legally vested in a Chancellor or judge
cannot, during the continuance of his commission, be in any way constitutionally
withheld or diminished.
The General Assembly are constitutionally bound to give a salary to a Chancellor or
Judge, which shall be secured to him during the continuance of his commission ;
but they may, by temporary appropriations, or in any other form, provide for the
payment of such a salary.
This was a controversy which originated between the House of
Delegates and the Senate, at the December session 1824, of the
General Assembly of Maryland, respecting the salary of the Chan-
cellor. No charge or imputation, of any kind whatever, was made,
by either house, against the Chancellor; nor does it appear, that
any complaint had been made, to either house, against him, by any
one; except that contained in a petition presented by Hugh
Thompson to the Senate without any previous application to the
Chancellor, praying to be permitted to appeal from an order which
had been passed by the Chancellor on the 12th of February 1825,
in the case of McKim v. Thompson. Although the Chancellor
was not, in any way, directly made a party to this controversy
between the then two houses of the General Assembly; or notified
by either house of its existence; yet as his interests were deeply
involved, he was thereby virtually made a party; and therefore, at
the next session of the General Assembly, he claimed the right to
appear, to defend his interests and to maintain his constitutional
independency. Accordingly he presented the following memorial,
and on the third day after the commencement of the session furnished
each member with a printed copy thereof.
By a note to the case of McKim v. Thompson, (ante, 171,) the
reader has been referred to this case. The mere principles of law
involved in that case can have no bearing upon this. In those
respects the two cases can have no sort of connexion with each
other. But on an attentive consideration of the various move-
ments in the December session of 1824, of the General Assembly,
as carefully stated in the following memorial, it cannot fail to be
perceived, that,'for some time previous to the passing of the order
of die 12th of February 1825, in the case of McKim v. Thompson,