

ing with, but in hostility to "the United States and its lawful authorities."

It is not, of course, supposed that Mr. Grason did all that was done by the company, but the evidence does show that no one was more active or had more influence in shaping the course of the company than he. He was an officer, could have retired at any moment that the proceedings were distasteful to him. He chose to remain in the company in arms, to take a leading part in its marchings, picketings and other services, and nothing could be more absurd than to say that he was acting as a friend or ally of the United State, while his subordinates were acting in armed hostility to the United States or its lawful authorities.

Your Committee, therefore, without going into the proof upon any other point, are forced to the conclusion that under this clause of the Constitution, Richard Grason is disqualified for holding the office of Judge of the Circuit Court of the 8th Judicial Circuit of the State; the same being an office of honor, profit and trust under the laws of this State.

The question of the qualifications of Mr. Ridgely, under the Constitution, was not fully investigated by the Committee, but the evidence of Mr. James M. Lester, which was heard, raised strong doubts whether Mr. Ridgely had that necessary residence in the county which would qualify him to hold the office.

In this position of affairs they can come to no other conclusion than that the election of November 8th, 1864, for Judge of the Circuit Court of the 8th Judicial Circuit, was a nullity; they therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That Richard Grason was not duly elected Judge of the Circuit Court for the 8th Judicial Circuit of the State, he being constitutionally disqualified for holding that position; and that the election of that date for Judge of that circuit, was a nullity.

WM. H. HOFFMAN,
WM. S. WOODEN,
UPTON BUHRMAN,
JAMES VALLIANT.