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SATURDAY, JANUARY 25, 1806

MESSAGE,

From the President of the United States,
respecting the application of HAMET CA-
RAMULLI, ex-bashaw of Tripoli.

(CONTINUED.)

Commodore Barron, to William Eaton,
Esquire.
MALTA, 22d March, 1805.

SIR,
By Captain Hull, who arrived in this harbor with the United States brig Argus under his command, on the 10th instant, I received your favor addressed to me, together with communications for the secretary of the navy, and copies of the correspondence betwixt yourself and captain Hull relative to your proceedings, from your arrival in Egypt until his departure from thence; also by the hands of Mahomed, secretary, a letter from his excellency Hamet Bashaw, announcing his junction with you, all which I have perused with an attention and deliberation which the important and interesting nature of their contents demands. I cannot but applaud the energy and preservation that has characterized your progress thro' a series of perplexing and discouraging difficulties, to the attainment of the object of your research, an attainment which I am disposed to consider as a fair pre- sage of future success.

On receipt of these communications by captain Hull, I did not lose a moment in making the necessary arrangements for sending you succours, and I now dispatch the Argus brig, with the Hornet sloop under her convoy, carrying a variety of stores and provisions, according to the accompanying list. Captain Hull will shape his course for Bomba, direct, where he calculates on finding you, with the Bashaw and his army, and where he supposes you will make a stand. I have directed him to deliver these stores to you, to be applied as your discretion may direct. He has also under his charge a sum in specie, amounting to 7,000 dollars, which is likewise to be placed at your disposal. By the time these vessels establish a communication with you, you will have been enabled to form a correct opinion as to the prospect of ultimate success, and thence to estimate the advantages likely to result to our affairs from this co-operation, and by this opinion you must be guided in the application of the succours. Should you have encountered unexpected difficulties and obstacles, which place the chances of success upon more than precarious ground, your own prudence will suggest the propriety of not committing these supplies, and the money, uncontrovertedly to the power of the Bashaw: indeed, in the point of view in which I regard the measures already pursued, as well as the subject of co-operation generally, I conceive we ought to tread with the utmost caution. It is far from my wish, sir, to damp your ardor, or that of your companions in arms, by laying too great a stress upon the cold maxims of prudence, whereby the tide of success is often lost; something, I am aware, should always be left to fortune, in enterprises of this nature: but I must own there are certain things, expressed in your dispatches, which, when brought to the test of my instructions from home, give birth to feelings of doubt and uneasiness; these I deemed it incumbent on me to point out to you with candor and explicitness, in order that we may be fully understood. You must be sensible that in giving their sanction to a co-operation with the exiled bashaw, government did not contemplate the measures as leading, necessarily and absolutely, to a reinstatement of that prince in his rights on the regency of Tripoli. They appear to have viewed the co-operation in question, as a means which, if there existed energy and enterprise in the exile, and attachment to his former subjects, might be employed to the common furtherance and advantage of his claims and our cause, and without meaning to fetter themselves by any specific and definite attainment as an end, which the tenor of my instructions and the limited sum appropriated for that special purpose, clearly demonstrate. I fear, by the convention you were about to enter into with Hamet, and by the complexion of other measures that a wider range may have been taken than is consistent with the powers vested in me for that particular object. These apprehensions may, perhaps, prove groundless, on further representation from you; but under my present impressions, I feel it my duty to state explicitly, that I must withhold my sanction to any convention or agreement committing the United States, or tending to press upon Hamet bashaw a conviction that we have bound ourselves to place him upon the throne. The consequences involved in such an engagement cannot but strike you forcibly, and a general view of our situation, in relation to the reigning bashaw and our ultimate coin- cidence in Tripoli, will be sufficient to mark its inexpediency. I shall consider

it my duty, as it is certainly my inclination to afford you every aid compatible with the authority vested in me, and commensurate with the means which have been placed at my disposal, and you may rely on the most active and vigorous support from the squadron, as soon as the season and our arrangements will permit us to appear in force before the enemy's walls; but I wish you to understand that no guarantee or engagement to the exiled prince, whose cause, I must repeat, we are only favoring as an instrument to our advantage, and not as an end in itself, must be held to stand in the way of our acquiescence to any honorable and advantageous terms of accommodation which the reigning bashaw may be induced to propose: such terms being once offered and accepted by the representative of government appointed to treat of peace, our support to the ex-bashaw must necessarily cease. You will not, however, conceive that these considerations, important and necessary as they are, ought to induce us at once to abandon the benefits which the measures you have adopted seem to promise. I conceive a perseverance in these by no means incompatible with a total freedom from any trammels, with respect to a definite object, which freedom I deem it all important to preserve, especially when I view the peculiar situation in which captain Bainbridge and his fellow sufferers may be placed by this co-operation.

If, by your energy and exertions, added to the supplies now sent forward, you succeed in getting possession of Derne and Bengazi, we may calculate, that, having received this impulse from our strength, the bashaw will, himself, possess sufficient energy, courage and talents, and if accounts are correct, sufficient interest among the people, to move on with firm steps, and to conduct his friends and followers to the gates of Tripoli.— Every support will, of course, be given to him by a systematic union of operations with the squadron, so as to enable him to get in the rear of the town; but should he be found deficient in those qualities, or that it appears we have been deceived in regard to the disposition of the inhabitants, he must be held as an unfit subject for further support or co-operation. I beg leave to mention to you, that as we are short of officers, the services of all will be wanted on board the respective ships as soon as we enter upon offensive measures. Should you conceive, however, that any serious disadvantage may result from withdrawing those with you, I have no objection to their remaining as volunteers; but it is impossible for me to comply with your requisition for 100 marines to be sent to the coast. Such a step, in the present posture of affairs, far exceeds my powers, and, besides, as we are rather short of hands, I could not feel myself justifiable in detaching so considerable a force from the squadron. I have not been unmindful of your requisition for field artillery, which I think is essential, but here it was impossible to procure it; I therefore dispatched, some days since, the Congress frigate to Messina, where I hope to obtain four field pieces complete for service, and as soon as they arrive they will be sent to the coast with the necessary ammunition. As I am still too unwell to write you with my own hand, I must refer you to captain Hull, in whose judgment and discretion I have the fullest confidence, for information on several collateral points, and for my sentiments on others. In this letter I have endeavored to explain, as clearly as possible, what are my ideas with respect to the wishes and intentions of our government, and what I feel to be the extent of my authority, relative to the co-operation with Hamet Bashaw. I reiterate my fixed resolution to afford you every support and assistance which are consistent with the powers and resources vested in me, adding, at the same time, my dissent from any guarantee, covenant or engagement, by which the United States may stand committed, to place the exiled prince on the throne, or any condition which militates against the most perfect and uncontrolled power of choice and action, in concluding a pacification with Jussuff bashaw, should he offer terms honorable and advantageous to our country.

I should be wanting in justice to you, sir, as well as to the officers who have shared thus far your toils and dangers, were I not to express my full reliance upon your courage, energy and perseverance, as well as my ardent desire that your most sanguine expectations may be realized. The observations which I here convey to you are far from being intended to cool your zeal or discourage your expectations, but they are what I conceive it necessary to make, and drawn from me by the purest feeling of duty, and as such, permit me to recommend them to your calm and candid consideration, and I request that you will make them the subject of conversation with Capt. Hull, who is fully possessed of my sentiments.

COPY.

From Commodore Barron to the secretary of the navy.
MALTA, 6th April, 1805.

Sir,
Having in my respects of yesterday given a full account of the present disposal of the squadron under my command, and whatever had occurred of notice since my preceding dispatches, I have now the honor to lay before you a sketch of Mr. Eaton's transactions in Egypt, and the measures which have been in consequence thereof adopted. The accom-

panying communications from that gentleman to the navy department, joined with copies of those addressed to me, and the collateral correspondence betwixt captain Hull and him, to all which I beg leave to refer you minutely, will afford you a wide view of the subject, whilst it precludes the necessity of lengthy comments from me. You will there perceive the many & unforeseen difficulties which Mr. Eaton met with in finding the ex-bashaw, who had joined the fortunes of the Mamelukes. You will be apprized of the situation in which matters stood at the departure of the Argus from Alexandria, on the 19th of February, and the plan which he had chalked out to pursue the intended co-operation with Hamet. On receipt of these advices I made immediate arrangements to send such part of the succours requested by the bashaw and Mr. Eaton, as could be procured here, and as I considered myself authorised by my instructions to afford; and captain Hull sailed again on the 26th ultimo, in the Argus, with the Hornet sloop, [the same which I mentioned having purchased] under convoy, carrying a supply of money, provisions, &c. He directed his course to Bomba; (a place about 60 miles to the eastward of Derne) where, as you will collect from the papers inclosed, he confidently expected to open a communication with the bashaw and his followers. Such, sir, is the present situation of the business.

I am well aware that you will feel an anxiety to know my opinion with regard to the probable success of this co-operation; but until I have further intelligence and more data to go by, it were improper even to hazard a conjecture. In perusing the letters from Mr. Eaton, and weighing the nature and consequences of certain measures in his contemplation, I must own that I have felt some uneasiness, arising out of a fear that he has taken a wider scope in his engagements to the bashaw, than is compatible with the ideas and intentions of government, or with the authority vested in me, as relates to the subject of co-operation. I have stated this apprehension in a communication to Mr. Eaton, in which I have also explained in precise terms, my own ideas, and how far I conceived he might proceed without committing himself or the country. A copy of a letter will be found annexed. I feel confident that the sentiments there expressed, and the principles laid down, with respect to the plan in question, will meet your approbation.

From the concurring information, principally from persons well acquainted with the bashaw, which I have recently received of his character, and conduct, I confess that my hopes from a co-operation with him are less sanguine than they were. Perhaps, however, I may shortly have reason to raise my expectations to their former standard; but till something occurs to justify the belief that he possesses more courage, energy, and talent, than those who appear to know him well, give him credit for it, it would be reprehensible to flatter myself or the government with prospects, which the result may disappoint. I am equally at a loss to calculate the effects of this co-operation upon the mind of the reigning bashaw; a short time will throw light upon this interesting point. In the meanwhile I cannot conceal from you my candid opinion, that from the obstinacy hitherto evinced by Jussuff Bashaw, and the pertinacity of his character, not unmix'd with bravery and other qualities belonging to a soldier, added to the natural advantages of his situation, the contest promises to be more arduous than was at first anticipated. Our co-operation with Hamet may, and in all probability will induce him either to offer us terms at once; or finding his dominions menaced and his life endangered, to put every thing to the hazard of war. In the latter case we may naturally conclude that his resistance will not only be obstinate, but desperate. I look with anxiety for the return of the vessel which sailed a few days since for Tripoli, with supplies for the prisoners, she will undoubtedly bring important intelligence.

The ex-bashaw's secretary of state, whom you will find mentioned in Mr. Eaton's correspondence, returned in the Argus to join his master. He appeared to be a sensible, discreet old man; he brought me a letter from the bashaw, a translation of which, with a copy of my answer, is attached to the accompanying papers.

Commodore Barron to William Eaton, Esquire.
MALTA, April 15, 1805.

SIR,
I had the honor of addressing you very fully on the 22d ult. by capt. Hull; since when I have received no advices from the Barbary coast. It was not till the 12th inst. that the Congress arrived here from Messina, with the field artillery, which captain Decatur experienced considerable delay and difficulty in procuring. It was my intention to have sent that frigate to the coast; but, on making particular enquiry of a pilot well acquainted in that quarter, I find that the impracticability of approaching the shore with heavy vessels, renders the communication extremely uncertain and difficult. I have, therefore, thought it prudent to wave my original intention, and to dispatch the Nautilus schooner, whose eight draught of water will enable her to approach the coast with greater safety and advantage. Captain Dent shapes his course for Bomba, where I calculated he will find you with the bashaw and army,

and where I hope he will have little difficulty in establishing an intercourse. He has on board his schooner two brass field pieces, with trains, powder, shot, &c. complete; which he is directed to deliver to your possession. I hope they will reach you safe; and have no doubt but they will be found extremely serviceable in the progress of your operations. Nothing material has occurred since capt. Hull's departure. The harbor of Tripoli remains closely blockaded. The President frigate sailed this day to reinforce the vessels already on that station. Capt. Dent is instructed, after delivering the artillery and stores, to return immediately to this port with dispatches from you. You will readily imagine my anxiety to hear of your proceedings and prospects.

I am respectfully, &c.
(Signed) S. BARRON.

Extract of a letter from Wm. Eaton to commodore Barron, dated, DERNE, April 20, 1805.

The information I have the honor to forward of this date, stating, in abstract, occurrences since my last, will not disappoint the expectations my calculations there may have formed. Certain periods of your letter of the 22d ult. require a distinct and separate answer. This I shall do with candor.

It was understood when government came to a determination to try the effect of a co-operation with Hamet Bashaw, against the enemy, that provision would be made, adequate to the experiment; six field pieces, a thousand stand of arms, with suitable ammunition, and eighty thousand dollars, were asked for by Hamet Bashaw, when yet in possession of this province, and gaining ground against the usurper. The secretary of the navy informed me that the arms, ammunition and fifty thousand dollars would be furnished, and they were to have been put on board at Hampton roads, whither, the squadron were getting ready for sea. Information arrived of the bashaw having been driven from his post and retired to Egypt. In consequence of which it is to be presumed the supplies getting in readiness were withheld, as the success of the experiment then appeared very doubtful. The twenty thousand dollars deposited with the consul general at Algiers, to be applied to this service, cannot be supposed adequate to the purpose of bringing the Bashaw from his exile in Egypt, placing him in a situation to act against a rival, possessed of all the resources of his kingdom, and carrying his plan of operations into effect, whatever may have been the dispositions of the people towards him. The twenty thousand dollars, therefore, could have been meant only to assist the research of the bashaw, and the revival of his affairs, in case our plan should be thought feasible. Hence I think it is not presuming too far to conclude, that the unlimited discretion vested in the commander in chief, in regard to all the exigencies of this war, and particularly as it relates to the object in view, extends to every matter necessary to its accomplishment. The instructions to the secretary of the navy certainly cannot mean to tie him down to any limited applications.

The advantages calculated to result from the success of this measure have heretofore been stated, and thus far the experiment has not disappointed these calculations. We are in possession of the most valuable province of Tripoli; the high estimation the enemy places on this department of the kingdom is evidenced by the extraordinary efforts he has used to defend it, and by the menaces to which he has resorted to deter us from the operations here; this camp was only 14 hours march from the place when we seized it by assault. I am this evening informed they are retrograding and only regret we have not the means of pursuing them. The expenses already incurred in this expedition will amount to nearly 30,000 dolls.; for 13,000 of which we are indebted to Messrs. Briggs and Brothers of Alexandria, 11,000 have been received through the hands of captain Hull, including his advance and drafts in Egypt. I have disbursed nearly 2000, and for the residue shall be indebted to individuals. This expense will not appear extravagant, when it is considered that it covers all our expenditures in Egypt, where many sacrifices were necessary to pass the barriers of Turkish jealousy and avidity, in getting the bashaw through that country; of furnishing horses, tents, arms and ammunition, preparatory to our entering the desert; of provisioning 1,200 souls, and about 200 horses, in that barren desert, upwards of forty days, a distance of nearly five hundred miles, and of caravans for transporting these provisions the whole distance from Alexandria, and also the unavoidable expenditures in presents to chiefs, and payments of troops, in order to gain the one and avail ourselves of the services of the other.

May 1st.
The situation in which it is known Hamet Bashaw was found in Upper Egypt, must of itself suggest the idea, that he must be destitute of all means of moving a military expedition, except the attachment of his subjects. The possession of this province does not materially alter that situation. The general failure of the harvest, which the whole coast of Barbary experienced last season, together with the extraordinary tributes which Jussuff Bashaw has exacted to support the war, has rendered not only this, but every other part of Tripoli poor and oppressed, wholly

destitute of contributing any thing very considerable to either of the rival brothers. This is a circumstance favorable to our measures, if we will go to the expense of profiting of it. No chief, whatever may be the attachment of his followers, can long support military operations without the means of subsisting and paying his troops. The observation is peculiarly applicable to the temper and circumstances of the Arabs of this country, who, in fact, form its real strength; who are poor, yet avaricious, and who being accustomed to despotism, are generally indifferent about the name, or person, of their despot, provided he imposes no new burthens. Stronger proof of this cannot be brought, than the difficulty Jussuff Bashaw's camp has found in recruiting; in his progress from Tripoli. It left there long since with about two hundred men.

I have, this morning, intercepted six letters from that camp, dated only four days since, signed by the commander in chief, the governor of Bengazi, and aide-camp, addressed to the governor of Derne, and to several chiefs or sheiks, encouraging them to hope and perseverance, and stating that their delay has only been occasioned by expectations of receiving reinforcements from the Arab tribes. They have increased their number only three hundred, though they have passed through that part of the country nearest, and most nearly attached to the enemy. Hamet Bashaw brought two thousand Arabs into the field on the 27th. This serves to shew the weight of money with these people, and as a pretty good criterion of the balance of influence between the two bashaws. With the aids contemplated by government to have been furnished Hamet Bashaw, when in the position he now holds, I have no doubt but he may proceed to the walls of Tripoli. But while I offer this opinion, I cannot conceal my apprehensions, grounded on experience, that when arrived there, he could effect little, without more military talents and firmness, than exists either in himself or the hords of Arabs who attach themselves to him. They are exactly what Volney describes of the camps of the Egyptian beys, rather a rabble than an army; and in our affair have they held safe positions to catch fugitives, until the doors of the enemy were opened for plunder, when they became at once brave and impetuous. If, therefore, the co-operation is to be pursued with him, and its direction is to be confided to me, it must be on conviction that detachments of regulars may be occasionally debarked from the squadron, or procured elsewhere, to aid and give effect to such operations as require energy. With the supplies asked for, provisions for our Christians, and with the firm front of one regular regiment, I believe it would not be presuming too far to engage, in conjunction with the squadron, to force the enemy to take refuge in a sanctuary. But I confess, sir, there is one discouraging circumstance resulting from the declared views in affording auxiliaries to Hamet Bashaw. These aids are to be withdrawn at any period, when the enemy shall propose terms of peace which may be accepted by the agent of government on the spot. If Hamet Bashaw is to be used solely as an instrument to the attainment of an object exclusively to the advantage of the United States, without any consideration to his future existence, or well being, I cannot persuade myself, that any bond of patriotism dictates to me, the duty of having a chief agency, nor indeed any, in so extraordinary a sacrifice. Certainly the enemy will propose terms of peace with us, the moment he entertains serious apprehensions from his brother. This may happen at any stage of the war most likely to rid him of so dangerous a rival, and not only Hamet Bashaw, but every one acting with him, must inevitably fall victims to our economy. If we proceed no farther, it would seem incumbent on the honor of government, in the event of peace, at least, to place Hamet Bashaw in a situation as eligible as that from which he has been drawn, out of the power of an incensed and vindictive enemy. Probably Jussuff Bashaw would agree to establish him in the government of this province and Bengazi, and to restore to him his family. He may perhaps be made satisfied with such an accommodation, and the United States experience from it many of the advantages calculated to result from carrying the original plan into execution, and consistently with both our honor and interest. At all events, I am deeply impressed with the opinion, that the post we have secured here should not be abandoned, nor terms of peace precipitately embraced; indeed it were to be wished that the effect of the success of a co-operation might be tried. It would very probably be a death blow to the Barbary system. Any accommodation, favoring of relaxation would as probably be death to the navy, and a wound to the national honor. If it is determined either to proceed or hold a position here, further supplies of cash and provisions must immediately be sent to the coast. From reasons which will suggest themselves from preceding observations, it would not be good policy in Hamet Bashaw to levy contributions during the contest with his brother, lest it should alienate his friends. On the contrary he ought to be enabled to move with a liberal hand. Cash will do much with the inhabitants of this country; even