

a population of forty-eight thousand seven hundred and eighty-six. When it is remembered that, all the people contribute alike, in proportion to their property, to the wants of government, there ought to be no such gross inequality in the distribution of the fund intended to secure a prompt and efficient administration of the laws.

We have in commission, twenty-one common law Judges and a Chancellor, at an expense for their salaries of \$36,500 per annum. There can be no question but that many of these officers are supernumeraries. We are now surrounded by States, in no one of which is to be found, such an extravagant and ill-organized Judiciary system as ours, and in all of which, the laws are still faithfully executed without complaint from the public as to their delay, and an absence of all protest by the Judges in commission, against the imposition of duties too onerous to be easily performed. Indeed, there is not a State in the whole Union, notwithstanding the population of several of them is quadruple that of ours, where the number of the law Judges, and the amount of their salaries, are not less than those of Maryland. New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio having, three of them, a population four times greater, and one of them a population more than three times greater than ours, pay respectively a less sum in the annual salaries of their Judges than that with which our Treasury is charged. The same States have each a superficies over which their laws are extended, more than four times as great as that of Maryland, and nevertheless have in commission a less number of Judges. In the payment of unnecessary salaries to Judges, since our system was framed, more than five hundred thousand dollars have been wasted. With these illustrations before us, of the effects to be expected from a re-organization of the system, so as to diminish sensibly its cost, we ought not to pause in the discharge of a high public duty, from any apprehensions as to the effect of such a proceeding on the interests and well-being of society.

Besides these objections to the system, another will be found in the fact, that no effectual means are provided in the Constitution, to get rid of Judges once commissioned, as promptly as the public interests may sometimes demand. The tenure during good behaviour is found in practice to be tantamount to a term for life. A Judiciary, independent of all the evil passions that may influence, at intervals, the mass of the community, is certainly desirable. But it does not appear, that a tenure for life will in itself, exempt the occupant of a seat on the bench from the possibility of feeling in a greater or less degree, a sympathy in the passions, that sometimes sway to and fro our popular assemblies. Observation compels us all to contest such a conclusion. A tenure for life is, and ought to be, a popular doctrine in Great Britain. Such a tenure there, may afford a safeguard to the people against the influence of the Crown. The commissions of the Judges being granted by the King, a periodical re-appointment would give to